Strategic partnership between states is a reciprocal exchange built on mutual commitment.
Introduction
Friendly bilateral ties, close cooperation and strategic partnership, defining relations between Lithuania and the United States (U.S.) for almost two last decades, are generally based on reciprocal national interests as well as benefits; this is an exchange built on mutual commitment 1 . If a strategic partnership between states is conceptualised as a reciprocal exchange, the question then arises: What does this partnership give to each side -Lithuania and the U.S.? On one hand, 1 a small state like Lithuania may be treated as a major beneficiary enjoying 'the shade of the hegemony' 2 , as it gains vital security assurances from the U.S. On the other hand, it is sometimes highlighted that Lithuania is not the only one that benefits from the partnership. According to the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė, 'on the regional level, the Baltic States have been and will remain strategically important to the U.S.' 3 . The significance of the U.S. to Lithuania is unquestionable, however, why should the U.S. care about Lithuania? Taking into account that Lithuania is a small state with very limited resources and capabilities, one looks into the strategic goals of the U.S. There is a reason to believe that the benefits of the bilateral partnership for the States stem not so much from Lithuania's goodwill or efforts but from the interests of the U.S. as a great power. In other words, the U.S. concerns for Lithuania arise out of its own strategic calculations. However, an emphasis on the U.S. interests and policies allows ignoring the question about Lithuania's engagement and input into the partnership. What does Lithuania propose to the U.S. when it claims the 'strategic partnership'? 4 First, the verb 'to propose' is chosen deliberately to indicate the proactive Lithuanian foreign policy, instead of the word 'to give', which implies favourable but passive nature of the partner. Second, the question is not merely about the formal and declarative dimension of strategic partnership 5 , but about factual support and active contribution made by Lithuania in the partnership with the States.
Third, there is another good reason to ask what Lithuania is able 'to propose' to the U.S. Normally small states seek strategic partnership out of the rational and pragmatic interest to strengthen their international position and increase gains. Even if taking this realist assumption for granted, one cannot ignore that strategic partnerships entail not only egoistic calculations but a normative element 6 as well, embedded in affinity and mutual commitment: 'The extraordinary closeness of the subjects comes from the mutual share of common strategic goals, and belief that a long-term cooperation effectively facilitates its implementation' 7 . In short, mutual trust and loyalty are obligatory conditions of a strategic partnership. 8 Therefore, the assistance that Lithuania is able to offer to its strategic partner indicates its loyalty and reinforces the bilateral partnership.
Of course, the question how Lithuania can strengthen its commitment and ties with the U.S. has been open since the beginning of Lithuania's membership in the NATO in 2004. Lithuania fosters this cooperation, but in most cases this is done primarily out of its own self-interest, based on reasoning of realpolitik. For example, the Lithuanian-U.S. strategic partnership was put in practice with joint military exercises in the Baltic region, U.S. support for NATO's Baltic air policing mission operating out of Šiauliai airbase as well as support for the Vilnius-based Energy Security Centre of Excellence 9 . However, the very fact of cooperation and engagement does not reveal much about Lithuania's commitment as a strategic partner as long as this engagement is of service to Lithuania's interests first and foremost. In this article, it is proposed that Lithuania's engagement and commitment to the strategic partner are tested in critical moments, when the U.S. need international support, and Lithuania offers its positive response even without direct, obvious and critical benefits and even if this support requires considerable effort (to do something) or costs (to sacrifice something) 10 . Therefore, this article raises the following question: how does Lithuania contribute to the strategic partnership with the U.S.? To be precise, does Lithuania support and pledge its allegiance to the U.S. when this support goes beyond the limits of direct responsibilities of strategic partner, or even enters into a conflict with other important responsibilities or interests of the state? In order to answer this question, the major task is to identify how Lithuanian foreign policy deals with international issues that are highly relevant to the U.S., but have low relevance to Lithuania itself. The first part of this article is designed to review the existing research on Lithuanian-U.S. relations and to outline the criteria against which Lithuania's Lithuania's participation in the antiterrorist campaign after 9/11 terrorist attacks and interrelated costs, risks and disapproval by other EU countries is a great example of such state behaviour.
contribution to the strategic partnership will be evaluated. Then empirical cases of Lithuania's contribution to the partnership and the support for the U.S. during the year 2004-2014 (a decade after Lithuania's formal membership in the transatlantic community) are explored in greater detail: the second part of the article covers the cases where support to the U.S. requires from Lithuania some additional effort or involves cost, and the third part presents the cases in which the realisation of strategic partnership requires to go beyond Lithuania's obvious foreign policy interests.
Past and present of Lithuania-U.S. relations
The launch of the strategic partnership between Lithuania and the U.S. goes back to the meeting in Washington in 1998, when the Baltic countries and the States signed the Charter of Partnership and Cooperation under which the U.S. committed itself to support Lithuania's aspiration to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After the NATO enlargement in 2004, the aspiration became a reality, and two approaches about the future of cooperation between Lithuania and the U.S. emerged. The first claimed that efforts must be taken to keep the U.S. interested in Lithuania, and even closer relations with this great power should be developed 11 . According to this approach, the long-term gains would outweigh the cost, such as contribution with financial and human resources to the U.S. international peacekeeping operations and democracy promotion 12 . Geopolitical thinking and theory of realism suggest that Lithuania must bandwagon with the U.S., otherwise it will disappear as an independent actor of international relations 13 . Besides geopolitical reasons for Lithuania to focus on the U.S., the pro-American foreign policy of Lithuania was supported with references to historical and cultural links between two countries and a large diaspora of Lithuanian Americans 14 . However, when arguing in favour of this cooperation, it was also admitted that the relations between Lithuania and the U.S. have not been settled, well established and straightforward, and there were many policy areas where Lithuania should strengthen its relations with the U.S. 15 . According to the second approach on the future partnership, relations between Lithuania and the U.S. were fragile, thus Lithuania had to better strengthen its cooperation with the European allies 16 . It was argued that the U.S. was not the only provider of Lithuania's security, and the focus on the U.S. 'was not adequate to the importance of the U.S. to Lithuania's national identity and security, economic and cultural interests' 17 . The security and identity nexus in the Lithuania-U.S. relations indicated that there was no reason to turn to 'coexistence' or 'conflict'; however, it was obvious that 'cooperation' would not transform into 'integration'
18
. Here cooperation was treated with caution even when looking from the point of view of national interests, for example, the unconditional support for the George W. Bush's foreign policy, carried out by military means, was considered unwise 19 . Moreover, it was argued that Lithuania should focus not only on the security but also on the welfare: such security in the broad sense was provided not by the U.S. and NATO, but by the EU, thus Lithuania should pay more attention to the Western allies in Europe -Germany, France and the United Kingdom -and to defend its interests in the EU 20 . The prospects for Lithuania-U.S. relations depend on Lithuania's foreign policy opportunities and interests. The opportunities are mainly affected by ' neighbourhood with Belarus and Kaliningrad region of Russia, Lithuanian initiatives to reduce Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, the support for the U.S. anti-missile defence system in Europe, to name a few factors in the development of the partnership, are of high importance to the U.S. However, these issues have been even more relevant for Lithuania's national security. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the viability of strategic partnership emerges in critical moments when partners' policies diverge and states face serious dilemmas; in our case, these are moments when Lithuania must choose one of several equally important alternatives -either to back the U.S. or leave its strategic partner behind.
The analysis of Lithuania's allegiance to the U.S. as the strategic partner focuses on three instances of state action: Lithuania supports, does not support or does nothing to support the U.S. Doing nothing or abstaining from the direct support can also suggest (although not so strongly as in the first two cases) that Lithuania discreetly supports or opposes the U.S. (depending on the case). When Lithuania supports the U.S. foreign policy, the following options are possible: (a) Lithuania supports the U.S. when it makes no difference to Lithuania's interests (there is no cost or benefit); (b) Lithuania supports the U.S. in spite of significant consequences -political disagreements with other countries or any other costs (financial, human resources, etc.).
Since Lithuania is an EU member, most pressing dilemmas that may challenge Lithuania's strategic partnership with the U.S. can be provoked by the U.S.-EU disputes. The notable example was the clash between U.S. and Europe over the intervention in Iraq in 2003, when 'the transatlantic rift thus made its appearance as a crack within Europe itself ' 28 dividing the pro-American and anti-American countries: the Central and Eastern European countries regarded the U.S. as the main security provider and 'they do not believe that European "core" nations, though also members of NATO, would have either the will or the power to come to their defence in case of need'
29 . Thus the analysis with the focus on foreign policy dilemmas enables to identify the 'substantial content' of the U.S.-Lithuania strategic partnership, and to move beyond addressing the partnership in terms of the needs of and the benefits to the Lithuanian security and foreign policy.
Releases, The White House President Barack Obama, September 3, 2014, http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/fact-sheet-united-states-and-lithuania-nato-allies-and-globalpartners. In order to explain what type of action Lithuania has chosen towards the U.S. in critical moments, the next section, first, provides insights into the disagreements between the U.S. and Europe (the EU or its particular member states) which put Lithuania into dilemmas of strategic partnership; second, the section analyses cases of Lithuania's support or opposition to the U.S. when Lithuania bore no apparent national interest in such support or opposition. For this purpose, it is difficult to discover public debates and speeches that reveal the position of Lithuania towards the American partner. Thus the data on Lithuania's voting practice on issues of great importance to the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly in 2004-2013 is analysed.
Coordination of interests
This section outlines challenges in the U.S. 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement
The negotiations about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement between the U.S. and the EU began in 2013, and this was one of the major topics during the Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council. The most active supporters of the agreement were Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and France was the leading opponent 30 . The U.S. had two reasons to encourage European countries to seal the TTIP deal: they aimed to address own domestic economic and social problems and to increase their capacity in the future competition with emerging economies in Asia 31 . The representatives from the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union had a straightforward message to the Lithuanian Government: 'We suggest […] to maintain the political momentum in the negotiations on TTIP' 32 . Lithuania had a positive attitude towards the TTIP agreement as it was seen to stimulate economic growth both in the EU and the U.S. Therefore, according to President Grybauskaite, 'Lithuania will do its best to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible'
33
. The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania regarded the contract as a tool to strengthen the transatlantic cooperation, because 'the strengthening of the transatlantic connection is an important contribution to the European security' 34 . However, despite the perceived potential economic gains, the TTIP agreement challenged Lithuania to choose between the national, European and U.S. interests. Namely, the TTIP agreement could prompt to revise the EU restrictions on production, labelling and marketing of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and one of the U.S. claims was to allow the import of products containing GMO to the EU. The use of GMOs is regulated by the national governments, thus the success of the U.S.-EU deal on the matter and Lithuania's firm position against GMOs could reduce its own economic competitiveness 35 . Despite this and the interests of the U.S., Lithuania took the so-called conservative approach: since 2010 Lithuania supported the restriction or prohibition of the use of GMO in the EU debates and has repeatedly spoken against GMO in the EU Environmental Council
36
. However, in discussions with the U.S. or negotiations on the TTIP, Lithuania did not bring this question up. Perhaps it was expected that Lithuania's interests will be defended by the EU: according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 32 Greta Jankaitytė, "Iššūkis Lietuvai -ES ir JAV laisvos prekybos sutartis" (A Challenge to Lithuania -EU-U. S. Free Trade Agreement), Ekonomika.lt, June 2, 2013, http://ekonomika.balsas.lt/naujiena/ issukis-lietuvai-es-ir-jav-laisvos-prekybos-sutartis-39732.html#ixzz3KZNw9TWy. 'leaders of the European Union have assured us that the EU quality standards are not negotiable and they will not be reduced' 37 . Another issue that became relevant during the TTIP negotiations was data protection. The EU and the U.S. have an agreement on rules of personal data storage and privacy, but, because of different treatment of data protection regulations, transatlantic disagreements emerged about the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the system of airline passenger name retention 38 . Lithuania has ratified the EU-U.S. agreement on Passenger Name Record Data Transfer in 2008. This was important to the U.S. as the agreement had to be ratified by all EU member states so that the U.S. could cooperate with the EU in combating the threat of terrorism. It was important for Lithuania to support the U.S. as it still struggled for a positive decision on a visa-free travel to the States (and joined the Visa Waiver Program the same year). Therefore, no significant discussion arose in Lithuania, in contrast to its strong reaction to the EU's attempts to consider the possibility of collecting data on airline passengers 39 . The agreement on data protection became relevant once again in the context of the TTIP deal after the disclosure of the U.S. mass surveillance programs that did not bypass the European allies. The EU has warned the U.S. about the possibility to revise the agreement on exchange of data and promised to ensure that the EU data protection standards would not be reduced in the negotiations on the TTIP 40 . According to the European Commission, information about the surveillance activities of the U.S. 'has had a negative impact on the transatlantic 37 "Artėjant laisvos prekybos sutarčiai tarp Europos Sąjungos ir Amerikos svarbiausia -būti pasirengusiems" (It is Important to be Prepared as the Negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement Come to an End), Politika, Ekonaujienos.lt, April 17, 2014, http://www.ekonaujienos.lt/naujienos/ politika_ir_visuomene/politika/S-426/straipsnis/Artejant-laisvos-prekybos-sutarciai-tarp-EuroposSajungos-ir-Amerikos-svarbiausia--buti-pasirengusiems. 45 . To sum up, during the U.S. and the EU negotiations on the TTIP deal Lithuania had to balance many issues. Lithuania was an active supporter of the TTIP but had to consider compromises on the regulation of GMOs. Although during the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the EU Lithuania was obliged to make the statement on data protection and information security, this duty also allowed the state to hide behind the veil of a 'neutral mediator' -the role required by the Presidency status (nevertheless, by that time Lithuania had already ratified the EU agreement on the data transfer favourable to the U.S.). 
The arms embargo on China
In 2003-2005, the EU considered lifting the arms embargo against China that operated since 1989 46 . After Lithuania entered the EU, it had to decide which group of countries -the U.S. or the EU -it would support on this issue because the States opposed the idea of lifting the arms embargo. The High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, described the arms embargo as 'unfair' and 'anachronistic' 47 . The idea to lift the embargo was promoted by France and Germany in order to improve trade relations with China (although they changed their opinion later), as well as by Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom, and Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden opposed 48 . France demanded the voting to take place before the EU enlargement: in order to lift the arms embargo, the unanimous decision of the EU member states was needed, and it was feared that the new pro-American EU members will compromise the vote 49 . The decision to lift the arms embargo was to be adopted in 2005, but failed when the United Kingdom and other countries refused to accept it 50 . The U.S. opposed the lifting of the arms embargo against China, since it would increase the regional instability and ignore human rights issues. There were indications that the U.S. may restrict military cooperation with Europe in the case of policy revision: U.S. Lithuania discussed the lifting of arms embargo against China in meetings with the U.S. representatives 52 . The state found itself in quite a complicated situation. Voting 'against' the lifting of embargo would have discredit the initiative of the 'old' EU member states. However, voting 'in favour' could jeopardise relations with the U.S. and also have a direct negative impact on the security of Lithuania, if the U.S. were to decide to restrict their defence cooperation with the EU countries and Lithuania. Finally, Lithuania has chosen to support the major EU states, and Lithuanian diplomats unofficially declared that 'Lithuania would not destroy the consensus in the EU on the arms embargo against China, if such consensus was reached' 53 . The under-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Albinas Januška, was even more straightforward, he doubted whether the lifting of the arms embargo was in the interests of Lithuania's security, and assumed, that 'Lithuania "would be raped" to accept the lifting of arms embargo against China, because it was important to the French and German interests' On the one hand, the transfer of responsibility to the EU was advantageous to Lithuania in relations with both the U.S. and China, and it came out as a surprise for the 'old' EU countries that feared the unconstructive behaviour of the new pro-American member states. On the other hand, being aware that some EU countries opposed the lifting of the arms embargo and thus precluded the consensus, Lithuania could be more supportive to the U.S. approach without the apprehension of compromising the European initiative. Lithuania's position on the arms embargo against China was not traceable in the renewed public debate. Such a stance and former humble Lithuanian support to the EU (despite having a different policy position) could indicate that Lithuania did not support the U.S. on this matter.
Trade embargo against Cuba
The U.S. imposed and extended economic sanctions against Cuba in 1960-1962 59 , and although in 2009 the States eased some restrictions, they still hold to the position not to recall sanctions until the Cuban regime takes the path of change 60 . In contrast, the EU believes that changes in Cuba should be encouraged by establishing closer cooperation, and urges the U.S. to lift the embargo. In 2008, the EU lifted economic sanctions against Cuba, imposed since 2003, and resumed a dialogue with the Cuban government 61 . Most of the states around the world do not support the U.S. sanctions against Cuba. In 2013, the UN General Assembly voted for the resolution to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba for the 22nd consecutive 56 year: only Israel supported the States (three other microstates abstained), and the remaining 188 voted in favour 62 . In the UN General Assembly Lithuania supports the lifting of the economic embargo against Cuba, and its policy towards Cuba is guided by the European Council's common position, which regulates the EU's relations with Cuba since 1996 63 . In 2007, Cuba initiated diplomatic cooperation with Lithuania, and in the same year the resolution to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba was registered in the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania. However, the relations were not established until the debate resumed in 2013: Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that Lithuania was the only EU country that had not established diplomatic relations with Cuba. This was important because Lithuania was preparing for the Presidency of the Council of the EU and could not ignore that 'the EU is Cuba's second most important trading partner and the biggest investor in the country'; the state also aimed to be elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, and Cuba could cast the vote in favour of Lithuania 64 . Members of the parliamentary opposition from the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats party opposed cooperation with Cuba as this, in their opinion, would have contradicted the priorities of Lithuania's Presidency of the Council and would have undermined Lithuania's relations with the U.S., thus the U.S. had to be consulted before carrying out such actions and policy revisions 65 . However, the fear that the diplomatic relations with Cuba would harm Lithuanian relations with the U.S. was futile in practice. On the 26 September 2013, when diplomatic relations with Cuba were established, Lithuania together with other EU member states' foreign ministers successfully took part in a discussion on international security issues with the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 66 . Thus 62 although the economic embargo against Cuba was very important for the U.S., most countries in the world did not support it and Lithuania aligned with them without loss in its strategic partnership.
The arms embargo and military operation in Syria
As noted by George Friedman, 'one of the most important aspects of the Syrian crisis is what it tells us about the state of U.S.-European relations and of relations among European countries' 67 . In 2013, the United Kingdom and France sought to lift the EU arms embargo that was established on the Syrian rebels in 2011 68 , and also urged Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to begin peace talks. By ensuring the support of Italy and Spain and the neutral position of Germany, the United Kingdom and France have lifted the EU arms embargo against the Syrian opposition (but not against the Syrian regime) 69 . The lifting of arms embargo against rebels was supported by the U.S., although the States supplied the Syrian opposition with only non-lethal weapons 70 . Austria, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland and Romania were against the lifting of the arms embargo.
Lithuania also questioned the benefits of lifting the embargo and called for a political solution to the Syrian crisis. According to foreign minister Linkevičius, Lithuania expressed a 'cautious' position and a view that more weapons will not bring more security in the region 71 . Before the voting in the EU Foreign Affairs 
The military operation in Libya
In 2011, international military intervention in Libya was launched. The United Kingdom and France urged to resort to military measures to rescue civilians and stop the regime, however, the U.S. remained undecided initially 77 . When the UN Security Council adopted resolutions on actions in Libya, the U.S., the United Kingdom and France took the lead of the coalition and were joined by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Qatar and Spain. Countries like Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Sweden, Luxembourg and other refused to contribute to the UN sanctioned mission in Libya, arguing that the objectives of the intervention were ill-defined and the mission was not led by the NATO. Since the beginning of the military actions, the U.S. aimed at conveying the responsibility for the mission to the international community. Thus the U.S. leadership lasted for a short period of time.
Within the few days before the official U.S. statement about military measures to be taken, Lithuanian President Grybauskaitė took part in the meeting of the European Council and said the following in regard to the use of force in Libya: 'Many countries, including Lithuania, assume that his cannot be done without the UN Security Council's resolution and the Arab League's consent'; she also urged the EU 'to prevent the humanitarian crisis'
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. Lithuania supported the NATO-led military operation in Libya and the propositions of EU's humanitarian operations. Attributing to the lack of resources, Lithuania offered its contribution only to humanitarian missions.
Nevertheless, a month later, a high political resonance followed the public statement of Lithuanian President Grybauskaitė who expressed doubts about 81 . It is worth noting that a couple of weeks prior to the statement of Lithuanian President, the U.S. President Barack Obama emphasised that, in accordance with the UN mandate, the U.S. goal was to defend the Libyan people and to establish a no-fly zone: 'If we tried to overthrow Qaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter', and there was no interest of going down the same road as in Iraq 82 . To sum up, it can be noted that Lithuania did not ask for or promote a special U.S. contribution in solving the crisis in Libya. Given the reluctance of the U.S. to participate in the intervention, it can be concluded that Lithuania was favourable to the States in terms of abstaining from the pressure to engage (just as France or the United Kingdom did) and calling to deal with the humanitarian crisis without the change of the Libyan political regime. The controversial rhetoric of Lithuanian Presidency actually did not contradict the general line of U.S. military disengagement. 
The status of Palestine
The Palestinian efforts to join specialised UN organizations in order to receive international recognition has divided the international community. The membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is among the issues of international disputes. The U.S. 
Lithuania's support to the U.S. in the United Nations
Voting practices in the UN General Assembly also reveal how Lithuania pledged assurance to the U.S. and solved emerging partnership dilemmas. This part of the article examines Lithuania's voting on issues that directly affected the Limiting the scope of the analysis to issues discussed in the UN General Assembly at least three times during the indicated decade, the following insights can be made. Lithuania and the U.S. had the same position on human rights (in Iran, North Korea, Myanmar, Syria) and always casted the 'no' vote against the . The policy issues on which Lithuania abstained and did not change its position over the years where linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Lithuania abstained on these issues for more than 30 times, while the U.S. consistently supported Israel.
In order to understand what kind of policy dilemmas Lithuania faced regarding the partnership with the U.S., a wider context of decisions needs to be assessed. Namely, the question is whether and under what circumstances Lithuania as a member of the Euro-Atlantic community was forced to choose either the U.S. or the EU during 2004-2013. Previous research reveals that EU members cast vote in the UN General Assembly as a cohesive group 87 , thus a divergent vote cannot be passed off unnoticed. Based on historical examples, it was assumed that after the EU enlargement in 2004, the relatively high EU voting cohesion would be temporarily reduced. Vaidotas Urbelis pointed out that before the accession to the EU and the NATO, Lithuania tended to support European countries on global issues (the Palestinian autonomy, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, sanctions against Cuba, the abrogation of Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty), and to stick with the U.S. on transatlantic matters (NATO's out-of-area operations, the EU defence policy and the EU-NATO duplication) 88 . During the year 2004-2013, in as many as 75 per cent of cases the EU member states voted unanimously on the issues of great importance to the U.S. (see Table 1 Urbelis, "U. S. Strategy Towards Lithuania," 59-60. member-states (the former consistently supported the Palestinian interests, while other EU countries abstained on these issues). If these two countries are excluded from the analysis, no unanimous decision by the EU countries was reached only in 7 per cent of the cases. Moreover, even in these cases the cohesion of the EU was considerable, and merely a few countries deviated from the majority. In this context, there were four exceptional votes in the UN General Assembly during 2008-2010 and 2012, when the positions of the EU states fundamentally split: some members supported the U.S., some opposed, while the rest chose to abstain (see Table 1 ).
In Intolerance. In all three cases, the U.S. argued that the Declaration misinterpreted the Israeli-Palestinian problem. For three years, the EU members could not reach an agreement whether to accept the point of view of the U.S., thus Lithuania received more space to manoeuvre. In 2008 five EU members (the Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) supported the U.S., while Belgium opposed and the rest of the Bloc, including Lithuania, abstained. In 2009, Lithuania's view did not change even though seven EU countries decided to back up the U.S. (the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and no one opposed. However, in 2010, the balance shifted significantly: 14 out of the 27 EU member states, including Lithuania, voted against the resolution and supported the U.S. Thus, eventually Lithuania changed its stance and acted in accordance with the U.S., but only after the balance had shifted inside the EU.
During the analysed period, there were three other policy issues on which Lithuania changed its attitude over time. To summarise Lithuania's voting practice in the UN General Assembly, it can be concluded that in a half of the cases Lithuania's and the U.S. positions coincided, and no significant dilemmas arose as the U.S. and the EU took identical policy positions. In most cases, especially when Lithuania abstained or opposed the U.S., Lithuania exercised a bandwagon with the EU. This trend is illustrated by the fact that eventually Lithuania's stance on some issues has changed but only to reflect the majority position in the EU. The cases that did not have an explicit majority vote in the EU (resolutions A/Res/63/242, A/Res/64/148 and A/Res/65/240) encourage Lithuania to gravitate towards the U.S. but again only when a critical mass of supportive EU countries used to form. In 2012, the General Assembly said a strong 'yes' to Palestine's status of a 'non-member observer state' in the United Nations, but the EU failed to come to a common position. At first glance, Lithuania was favourable to the U.S. as it took a neutral position in this case (did not support Palestine); however, the 'critical mass' factor likewise played out well here. When making this decision, Lithuania had a strong backup from almost a half of the EU member states, including Germany and the United Kingdom, while the Czech Republic even stood out with the direct support to the States.
Conclusions
The aim of this article was to examine whether Lithuania supports the U.S. when this support needs to go beyond the direct responsibilities of strategic partnership or even clashes with other commitments or foreign policy interests of Lithuania. Such an approach to strategic partnership enabled to determine what Lithuania could and did offer to the U.S. in exchange for security guarantees in 2004-2014. It can be concluded that in analysed cases Lithuania's support for the U.S., though strong in declarations, was quite ambiguous in action.
The cases when Lithuania did not support the U.S. on strategically important issues were the economic embargo against Cuba, the abolition of the death penalty and disarmament. Lithuania's abstention from the support was not very significant, because these were the cases when the U.S. did not receive much support from the rest of the international community as well. When solving other issues important to the U.S. -the lifting of the arms embargo against China, the regulation of genetically modified products, the Syrian conflict -Lithuania's foreign policy was passive and not overtly favourable to the U.S. However, Lithuania defended its actions by referring to the common EU position.
